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In Harm’s Way: Gender and Human Rights in National Security
JAYNE C. HUCKERBY*
INTRODUCTION
The last twenty years have seen remarkable shifts in the relevance of gender
and human rights in the national security arena. In the decade after the events of
9/11, policymakers across the globe sidelined both gender and human rights
perspectives.1 Subsequently, governments committed to take gender into account
in national security.2 Yet unlike some other areas of international governance,
which see gender through the lens of human rights, gender issues were largely
decoupled from human rights concerns.3 Paradoxically, even those approaches
that tried to connect gender to human rights, by arguing, for example, that gender
equality itself should be a security tactic,4 have undermined rights.
However, despite these complexities and the omnipotence of national
security practices, the consequences of these shifts are underexamined.5 This
Article traces these shifts and the approaches to gender and human rights that
underscore them. It centers the concept of gendered security harms—the idea that

Copyright © 2020 by Jayne C. Huckerby.

* Professor of Clinical Law, Duke University School of Law. I am very grateful for the comments
of Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Aya Fujimura-Fanselow, and Laurence Helfer, and to Ana Maganto Ramirez
for research assistance.
1. See generally JAYNE HUCKERBY & LAMA FAKIH, CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOB. JUSTICE, A
DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM (2011), http://chrgj.org/wp-content/up
loads/2012/07/locatinggender.pdf.
2. See generally Jayne Huckerby, Feminism and International Law in the Post-9/11 Era, 39 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 533 (2016) (tracing the uptick in attention to gender in counter-terrorism frameworks)
[hereinafter Huckerby, Feminism and International Law]; Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Jayne Huckerby,
Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to—Part I, JUST SECURITY (May 1, 2018), https://www.ju
stsecurity.org/55522/gendering-counterterrorism-to/ (explaining the recent attention to gender in
counter-terrorism architecture and programs) [hereinafter Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering
Counterterrorism: Part I] .
3. See Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Jayne Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not
to—Part II, JUST SECURITY (May 3, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/55670/gendering-counterterror
ism-to-part-ii/ [hereinafter Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part II].
4. Id.
5. For analyses of the gender, human rights, and legal implications of national security beyond
the immediate 9/11 moment, see generally HUCKERBY & FAKIH, supra note 1; Jayne Huckerby, Gender,
Counter-Terrorism and International Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
TERRORISM 163 (Ben Saul ed., 2014) [hereinafter Huckerby, Gender, Counter-Terrorism and International
Law]; Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, The ‘War on Terror’ and Extremism: Assessing the Relevance of the Women, Peace
and Security Agenda, 92 INT’L AFFAIRS 275 (2016).
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the national security arena is informed by “gendered assumptions, gendered
labels, and gendered hierarchies”6 and that it in turn can adversely shape these
assumptions and hierarchies, as well as differently impact persons of different
genders. It draws on this concept of gendered security harms not only to trace the
effects of these shifts in national security practice, but also to help illuminate how
gender and human rights were differently defined and valued at various
junctures.
A few preliminary points will help to frame the discussion. The Article takes
as a starting point that all government national security policies must comply with
international human rights law,7 including by incorporating a gendered analysis
of these policies.8 It uses the term “gender” to refer to a social construct of
attributes associated with masculinities and femininities rather than “sex,” which
focuses only on biological differences.9 It recognizes gender as being inextricably
linked to human rights, in part because it “permeates the context in which human
rights abuses take place.”10 At the same time, this Article is informed by an
understanding that, notwithstanding these connections, in practice, human rights
can be advanced in ways that are deeply antithetical to gender equality.11 Finally,
it understands gender and human rights questions to be implicated by a wide
array of national security practices, including “security-based” measures aimed at
countering terrorism, as well as those approaches directed at preventing or
countering violent extremism (P/CVE).12

6. Laura Sjoberg, Feminist Security and Security Studies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 45–46 (Alexandra Gheciu & William C. Wohlforth eds., 2018).
7. See, e.g., Ben Emmerson (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Freedoms While Countering Terrorism), Rep. of the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, ¶ 56(c), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/65 (Apr. 29, 2016)
(emphasis omitted) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/65].
8. See, e.g., Martin Scheinin (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Freedoms While Countering Terrorism), Rep. of the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. A/64/211 (Aug. 3, 2009) (the author
was involved in the research and writing of this report) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/64/211].
9. For application of this definition of gender in the context of analyzing the human rights
impacts of counter-terrorism and in feminist security studies, see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 20–22; Sjoberg, supra note
6, at 45–46.
10. Letter from Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions to the Int’l
Law Comm’n (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SexualOrientation/LetterGen
der.pdf.
11. RATNA KAPUR, GENDER, ALTERITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 15 (2018) (stating that “women’s rights
advocacy is moving further and further away from its promised goal of freedom in the context of
human rights.”).
12. U.N. Secretary-General, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/70/674
(Dec. 24, 2015) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/70/674]. There is no universal definition of the terms
“terrorism,” “violent extremism,” “extremism,” “counter-terrorism,” “preventing violent extremism,”
or “countering violent extremism.” This Article uses the term P/CVE to capture a set of programs that
are largely preventative in approach. See id. (describing the “need to take a more comprehensive
approach which encompasses not only ongoing, essential security-based counter-terrorism measures,
but also systematic preventive measures which directly address the drivers of violent extremism that
have given rise to the emergence of these new and more virulent groups”). Additionally, P/CVE
programs are designed to tackle violent extremism, a phenomenon that is understood as both “wider”
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The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an account
of the post-9/11 absence of an explicit consideration of either gender or human
rights. Part II covers how national security increasingly considered gender but not
from a human rights perspective. Part III examines those efforts to connect both
gender and human rights with national security. Within each of these parts, the
Article analyzes how the terms gender and human rights have been defined and
applied and identifies the effects of these approaches. Part IV then details some
key features of the current landscape of gendered security harms, looking at the
locations of such harms, the forms they take, and some challenges in measuring
them.
I.

GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE POST-9/11 MOMENT

National security practice in the first decade after 9/11 failed to explicitly
integrate either gender or human rights concerns.13 On the one hand, the
evacuation of human rights in the post-9/11 moment was ubiquitous. Widespread
practices of secret detention, rendition, and torture across the globe ensued, as did
ongoing impunity for these acts. At the same time, States also resisted any overt
scrutiny of the gender dimensions and effects of their policies. Instead, gender was
“simultaneously everywhere and nowhere” in countering terrorism.14 Gender was
omnipresent because of the pervasive underlying assumptions that terrorists were
men and that militarized and other traditionally “masculine” responses to
violence were required.15 But gender was simultaneously absent as strategies were
often gender-neutral on their face.16 Moreover, during this period, governments
did not analyze whether their policies had any adverse gendered effects, whether
(id. ¶ 4) than and “conducive to” terrorism (id. ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 2178, ¶ 15 (Sept. 24, 2014)). However, it
recognizes that, in practice, the distinctions between “security-based counter-terrorism measures” and
preventative approaches are increasingly blurred, including because the terms “violent extremism”
and “terrorism” are now “often used interchangeably and without a clear delineation of the boundaries
between them.” U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/65, supra note 7, ¶ 13. And also, because “[t]hough often
characterised as the ‘soft’ cousin of counter-terrorism initiatives, strategies to counter violent
extremism contain their own tangible risks for human rights.” Id. ¶ 17. Additionally, the relationship
between measures that counter, versus those that prevent, violent extremism is also unclear, in part
because the definition of these terms varies across jurisdictions. See, e.g., GLOB. COUNTERTERRORISM
FORUM, GOOD PRACTICES ON COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING AS
TOOLS TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM 1 (2009) (“[CVE] initiatives tackle conditions conducive to
radicalization into violent extremism with the ultimate aim of denying terrorist groups new supporters
and recruits. The strategies and tools that governments and civil society organizations use to counter
violent extremism vary, reflecting differing conditions and settings.”).
13. See, e.g., Jayne C. Huckerby & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Introduction, in GENDER, NATIONAL
SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES 1 (Margaret L. Satterthwaite &
Jayne C. Huckerby eds., 2013) (citations omitted) (“It is accepted feminist knowledge that the ‘War on
Terror’ abounds with gendered narratives, illustrated, for example, in the post-9/11 era with the U.S.
government and its allies launching a war in Afghanistan in part to ‘save’ Afghan women. However,
the gender and human rights dimensions and impacts of counter-terrorism measures outside of this
moment are largely undocumented and under-theorized.”); Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering
Counterterrorism: Part I, supra note 2.
14. Huckerby, Gender, Counter-Terrorism and International Law, supra note 5, at 164.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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that be on persons or on gendered hierarchies or stereotypes. Instead,
governments focused on terrorists’ harms against women17 rather than those that
might come from their own decision-making.18 This focus on women’s
vulnerability and the narrative of “saving” women from terrorists also gave
impetus to, and justification for, a series of “hard” counter-terrorism measures,
including military action.19 As I have argued elsewhere, this failure to take gender
into account was remarkable as the post-9/11 decade was also the time of core
gains in international law on gender and human rights.20 However, while both
areas—security and gender—were ascendant in global politics, each track
proceeded largely in parallel.
During this period, governments also took a restrictive stance on how they
understood the term “gender” when it came to the national security arena.
Specifically, governments rejected the effort to scrutinize national security policies
under the long-standing United Nations (U.N.) approach of defining gender as a
social construct that was not synonymous with “sex” or women.21 This much was
made clear by the adverse response to the 2009 report of the then-U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism.22 That report uses this social definition of
gender to fully track the gender and human rights dimensions and impacts of
counter-terrorism measures.23 By not limiting gender to women—and integrating
gender with the human rights lens—the report showed how, in the name of
counter-terrorism, governments had perpetrated a host of gendered human rights
violations against women, men, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and

17. See, e.g., Ratna Kapur, Un-Veiling Women’s Rights in the ‘War on Terrorism,’ 9 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL’Y 211 (2002) (identifying the ways in which an appeal to rescuing women’s rights in
Afghanistan enabled military intervention). See also Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra
note 2, at 556 (noting that the focus on women as victims has the effect of “marginalizing the experience
of other targets of violent extremists, such as gay men or religious minorities”).
18. Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 562 (arguing that “the focus on
women’s victimhood at the hands of terrorists, . . . along with a formalist impulse to address only men
as victims of counter-terrorism, created the perfect storm for silence on State violations of women’s
rights and gender equality in counter-terrorism efforts”). See also HUCKERBY & FAKIH, supra note 1, at
9; Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Situating Women in Counterterrorism Discourses: Undulating Masculinities and
Luminal Femininities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1085, 1121 (2013).
19. See, e.g., Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 548 (“[I]n practice, counterterrorism and CVE policy regularly use images of women’s vulnerability and harm, including as a
means to justify counter-terrorism actions.”). See also id. at 547–51 (tracing the narratives of gendered
victimhood and vulnerability in the aftermath of 9/11 as well as the effects of these constructions).
20. See generally Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2; Huckerby, Gender,
Counter-Terrorism and International Law, supra note 5, at 164.
21. See Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 566–67 (noting that this embrace
of gender was particularly confronting because “the concepts were being applied by a non-genderspecific part of the United Nation’s institutional machinery . . . in a report to a non-human rights
body.”). See also id. at 562–67; Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part I supra note 2;
Dianne Otto, Transnational Homo-Assemblages: Reading ‘Gender’ in Counter-terrorism Discourses, 4 JINDAL
GLOBAL L. REV. 79, 82 (2013).
22. U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 8.
23. Id. ¶¶ 20–22.
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intersex (LGBTI) individuals, from the border to the battlefield.24 As such, the
report was at once a major dissonance to governments whose national security
policies were imbued with a focus on “saving” women from terrorism, and an
affront because it used a social definition of gender as part of the human rights
scorecard on national security decision-making.
During this period, these overarching features—the absence of human rights,
the “heavy but stealthy gendering”25 of national security, and a resistance to an
interpretation of gender beyond women—was consequential. The result was a
series of policies that differently and adversely impacted men, women, and those
of diverse gender identities and sexual orientations. Three general types of
measures—and corresponding impacts—can be observed. One set of these
impacts came when States engaged in gendered actions that violated human
rights. This included, for example, when States designed and implemented
interrogation techniques to specifically humiliate male suspects due to
assumptions about what was particularly harmful to Muslim masculinities.26 Or
when States used counter-terrorism laws to crack down on women’s rights
defenders seeking gender equality in their communities.27
Second, there were a series of adverse human rights impacts that came from
States failing to address how policies might have gendered human rights effects
because of how, in the new post-9/11 environment, gender might produce
“distinct vulnerabilities and risks linked to the way societies organize male and
female roles.”28 These can be best understood as examples of States’ genderblindness on security, combined with a lack of respect for human rights. Some
examples of this include the failure to address how national security measures that
targeted men also had broader gendered effects. This includes, for example, when
development measures were adopted based on risk rather than need and focused
on supporting the livelihoods of young men, rather than women, in ways that
reinforced discrimination in local communities.29 Other examples of this gender
blindness involved a failure to anticipate—or remedy—discriminatory human
rights impacts from counter-terrorism measures that were gender-neutral.
Counter-terrorism financing policies that were neutral on their face but
discriminatory in practice because they cut off funding to women’s organizations
that are typically nascent, small, and grassroots, are one example.30 Increasingly
stringent border security measures that make it harder for transgender persons to
change identity documents is another.31 Third, there were limited examples where
24. U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 8.
25. Huckerby, Gender, Counter-Terrorism and International Law, supra note 5, at 164.
26. See U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 8, ¶¶ 44–45.
27. Id. ¶¶ 27–28.
28. Agnes Callamard (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions),
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, on a Gender-sensitive
Approach to Arbitrary Killings, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/23 (June 6, 2017).
29. See, e.g., HUCKERBY & FAKIH, supra note 1, at 38.
30. See generally DUKE LAW INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC & WOMEN PEACEMAKERS PROGRAM,
TIGHTENING THE PURSE STRINGS: WHAT COUNTERING TERRORISM FINANCING COSTS GENDER EQUALITY
AND SECURITY 36–41 (2017) [hereinafter TIGHTENING THE PURSE STRINGS], https://web.law.duke.edu/
sites/default/ files/humanrights/tighteningpursestrings.pdf.
31. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 8, ¶ 48.
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States did seek to integrate a gender perspective in counter-terrorism approaches
but did so in ways that were not human rights-centric, and instead relied on, and
generated, harmful stereotypes. The example that is most prominent during this
period is focusing on the role of mothers to combat “radicalization” and identify
“at risk” family members because of an assumption that mothers were inherently
peaceful and at the center of their families.32
II. THE MOVE TO ADOPTING A GENDERED APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY
From a gender and human rights perspective, if the decade after 9/11 can be
understood as “a decade lost,”33 the subsequent period tells quite a different story.
Here, governments found gender—although not necessarily human rights—in
both terrorism and their response to it. There were five key openings that enabled
the incorporation of gender in national security: the growth of policies to prevent
or counter violent extremism; the linking of the women, peace, and security (WPS),
counter-terrorism, and P/CVE agendas; a perceived uptick in women joining
violent groups; the specter of terrorist violence against women; and buy-in to the
idea of gender equality as a national security tactic.34
Turning to the first of these factors: from 2010 onward, governments
increasingly moved from “hard,” post hoc counter-terrorism toward what was
referred to as more “soft” tactics, such as rule of law, human rights, and
development that were seen as part of preventative, holistic, and upstream efforts
to tackle violence.35 P/CVE was the umbrella term for these “soft” broad efforts.
There has recently been significant concern—that this Article shares—that these
so-called soft measures actually have had coercive effects.36 What was important
about this shift from a gender perspective is that it enabled more consideration of
gender precisely because these “soft” areas of government policy-making (for
example, development) were historically more open to gender analysis than

32. See, e.g., HUCKERBY & FAKIH, supra note 1, at 21, 26.
33. See generally id.
34. See generally Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 569–84 (tracing the
“conjoining of women’s rights and national security agendas”). See also Ní Aoláin & Huckerby,
Gendering Counterterrorism: Part I, supra note 2 (for further detail on the timeline of measures taken to
incorporate gender and counter-terrorism and P/CVE).
35. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/65, supra note 7, ¶ 17; Fionnuala Ni Aoláin (Special Rapporteur
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering
Terrorism), Rep. of Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism on the Role of Measures to Address Terrorism and Violent Extremism
on Civic Space and the Rights of Civil Society Actors and Human Rights Defenders, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/52
(Mar. 1, 2019) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/52] (addressing the impact of both counter-terrorism
measures and those to prevent or counter violent extremism on civic space); Fionnuala Ni Aoláin
(Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
While Countering Terrorism), Rep. of Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism on Human Rights Impact of Policies and Practices
Aimed at Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/46 1 (Feb. 21, 2020)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/46] (advanced edited version that "addresses the global and national
effects of the widespread use of policies and practices aimed at preventing and countering violent
extremism”).
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traditional security spheres, such as the military or law enforcement.37 One
measure of the extent of this integration is the 2016 U.N. Secretary General’s Plan
of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, which includes a dedicated section on
“[g]ender equality and empowering women.”38 Another is that UN Women—the
U.N. body dedicated to gender equality—joined the U.N. Counter-Terrorism
Implementation Task Force, a core piece of the U.N.’s counter-terrorism and
P/CVE architecture.39
Second, the women, peace, and security agendas and counter-terrorism and
P/CVE agendas increasingly intersected. This was particularly happening from
2015 onwards with the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2422 calling
for “greater integration” of the agendas.40 Third, the phenomenon of women
joining ISIS and other visible Jihadi organizations encouraged governments to
look more closely at the links between women and terrorism rather than just at the
roles of women in terrorism’s response or as its victims.41 Fourth, there has been
an increasing focus on the gendered abuses perpetrated by proscribed non-State
actors, which genders national security policy by requiring consideration of
female victims of terrorist groups.42 This impetus has recently continued through
an analysis of the link between trafficking in persons (particularly sex trafficking
of women) and other transnational organized criminal activities such as
terrorism.43 Finally, the idea of “feminism-as-counter-terrorism” gained increasing
traction.44 This presented the promotion of women’s rights as being not just the

37. See HUCKERBY & FAKIH, supra note 1, at 13 (“[T]his move toward a more holistic and ‘soft’
approach to countering terrorism broadens the role and stake women and sexual minorities have in
counter-terrorism efforts. . . . “); Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 552 (“[O]ne
key consequence of a more recent move toward ‘soft’ practices in countering terrorism and violent
extremism has been an upswing in efforts to promote security initiatives that include women.” See also
id. 572–73). See generally Huckerby, Gender, Counter-Terrorism and International Law, supra note 5.
38. U.N. Doc. A/70/674, supra note 12, ¶ 53.
39. Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 554.
40. See S.C. Res. 2242 ¶ 11 (Oct. 13, 2015) (calls for “greater integration” of the women, peace, and
security, and counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism agendas). See generally Huckerby
Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 573–75 (addressing the intersection of women, peace,
and security agenda, and the national security agenda).
41. See, e.g., Jayne Huckerby, The Complexities of Women, Peace, Security and Countering Violent
Extremism, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/26337/womens-rights-simpletool-counterterrorism/ [hereinafter, Huckerby, The Complexities of WPS and CVE]; Jayne Huckerby,
Gender, Violent Extremism, and Countering Violent Extremism, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 3, 2015), https://ww
w.justsecurity.org/20620/gender-violent-extremism-countering-violent-extremism-cve/. See generally
JOANA COOK & GINA VALE, FROM DAESH TO ‘DIASPORA’: TRACING THE WOMEN AND MINORS OF ISLAMIC
STATE, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF RADICALISATION (2018).
42. Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 547–51 (addressing the ways in
which constructions of gendered victimhood and vulnerability have informed national security policy).
43. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2462 (Mar. 28, 2019); S.C. Res. 2388 (Nov. 21, 2017); S.C. Res. 2331 (Dec. 20,
2016); S.C. Res. 2253 (Dec. 17, 2015); S.C. Pres. Statement 2015/25 (Dec. 16, 2015); S.C. Res. 2242 (Oct. 13,
2015); S.C. Res. 2195 (Dec. 19, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Unanimously Adopting
Resolution 2368 (2017), Security Council Reaffirms Its Resolve to Combat Terrorism, U.N. Press Release
SC/12917 (July 20, 2017), https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12917.doc.htm.
44. See, e.g., Barbara Ehrenreich, A New Counterterrorism Strategy: Feminism, in STOP THE NEXT WAR
NOW: EFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM 78 (Medea Benjamin & Jodie Evans eds., 2005)
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right but the smart thing for security policy.45 In practical terms, these factors have
involved governments looking at the following areas:46 to engage in “gendersensitive research and data collection on the drivers of radicalization for
women;”47 to address the “impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women’s
human rights and women’s organizations;”48 to assist female victims of
terrorism;49 and to encourage women’s gender equality and “empowerment” and
“the participation and leadership of women and women’s organizations in

(“So here in one word is my new counterterrorism strategy: feminism.”). See Vasuki Nesiah, Feminism
as Counter-Terrorism: The Seduction of Power, in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTERTERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 127 (critiquing this framing of feminism as
counter-terrorism). See generally JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK
FROM FEMINISM 31–35 (2006) (critiquing feminism’s “bad faith” in not scrutinizing its investment in
governance).
45. Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 575–76. See generally for further
examples, GLOB. COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM, ADDENDUM TO THE GCTF GOOD PRACTICES ON WOMEN
AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, WITH A FOCUS ON MAINSTREAMING GENDER (2019),
WOMEN,
https://www.thegctf.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=jA1tbXKhobE%3D&portalid=1;
UN
GENDER MAINSTREAMING, PRINCIPLES DIMENSIONS AND PRIORITIES FOR PVE (2019), https://www.un
women.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2019/gender-mainstrea
ming-principles-dimensions-and-priorities-for-pve-en.pdf?la=en&vs=5046 (the author was involved in
the process that preceded this document); GLOB. COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM, GOOD PRACTICES ON
WOMEN AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (2015), https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Docume
nts/Framework%20Documents/A/GCTF-Good-Practices-on-Women-and-CVE.pdf (the author was
involved in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe process that preceded this
document); Naureen Chowdhury Fink et al., The Roles of Women in Terrorism, Conflict, and Violent
Extremism: Lessons for the United Nations and International Actors (2013), https://www.globalcenter.org
/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/NCF_RB_LS_policybrief_1320.pdf.
46. See Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part I, supra note 2.
47. See S.C. Res. 2242, supra note 40, ¶ 12. See also GOOD PRACTICES ON WOMEN AND COUNTERING
VIOLENT EXTREMISM, supra note 45, at 3, 5–6 (citing Good Practices #2, #8, and #9); RADHIKA
COOMARASWAMY, PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE: A GLOBAL
STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325 231 (2015),
https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/UNW-GLOBAL-STUDY-1325-2015%20(1).pdf (the
author contributed to the background of this study); U.N. Doc. A/70/674, supra note 12, ¶ 53(b). See also
UN WOMEN, WOMEN AND VIOLENT RADICALIZATION IN JORDAN (2016), https://www.unwomen.org/en/
digital-library/ publications/2016/7/women-and-violent-radicalization-in-jordan.
48. See S.C. Res. 2242, supra note 40, ¶ 12. See COOMARASWAMY, supra note 47, at 231; U.N. Doc.
A/70/674, supra note 12, ¶ 53(b).
49. See, e.g., Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka, Under-Secretary-Gen. of the United Nations and Exec.
Dir. of UN Women, Remarks at the High-level Meeting on “Global Leadership – Local Partnerships:
Women’s Leadership and Gender Perspectives on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism”
(Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2016/9/speech-by-executive-director-onwomens-leadership-in-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism; H.E. Ambassador Koro Bessho,
Permanent Representative of Japan, Statement to the United Nations at the Panel Discussion on the
“Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Advancing Women’s Participation and Leadership” (Mar. 12,
2018), https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism.ctitf/files/Statem
entbyAmbassadorBessho_JAPAN_CSW_12March.pdf.
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developing strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism,”50 including in
security institutions,51 civil society,52 and as mothers.53
However, an underappreciated consequence of this uptake of gender is that
it has not necessarily been good for human rights, including women’s rights. The
reasons for this are twofold. The first is that “gender” has in practice meant
“women”54 (often Muslim women) and has relied on a series of stereotypes of
women as peaceful and maternal. Second, this attention to gender has had a
complicated relationship to human rights. In some instances, gender has been
siloed from human rights and gender equality.55 At the same time, gender has also
been connected to human rights in ways that have led to empowering the State—
including “the security and sexual surveillance apparatus governing gender”—
rather than ensuring gender equality.56 This is particularly true for two areas that
are explored further in Part III: the promotion of gender equality and women’s
empowerment as a national security tactic57 and the use of a gender equality lens
to encourage greater attention to female terrorists, but without ensuring full
human rights protections for suspects.
On the first factor, it has been correctly observed that “the majority of CVE
work incorporating gender perspective primarily addresses the inclusion of
women and/or girls.”58 To understand how this happened means tracing where

50. See S.C. Res. 2242, supra note 40, ¶ 13. See also U.N. Doc. A/70/674, supra note 12, ¶ 53(c)–(d);
S.C. Pres. Statement 2014/21, ¶ 11 (Oct. 28, 2014).
51. See, e.g., JOANA COOK, A WOMAN’S PLACE: US COUNTERTERRORISM SINCE 9/11 (2019).
52. See Chikodiri Nwangwu et al., Femininity is Not Inferiority: Women-Led Civil Society
Organizations and “Countering Violent Extremism” in Nigeria, 21 INT. FEMINIST J. OF POL. 168, 177 (2019)
(identifying such activities as involving women-led civil society organizations undertaking the
“provision of relief materials, protest marches, press conferences, advocacy visits to major
stakeholders, socio-economic services, rehabilitation of critical infra-structure and participation in
early warning workshops”). See also Eleanor Gordon & Jacqui True, Gender Stereotyped or Gender
Responsive? Hidden Threats and Missed Opportunities to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism in
Bangladesh and Indonesia, 164 RUSI J. 74 (2019).
53. See, e.g., Edith Schaffler & Ulrich Kropiunigg, Mothers Against Terror, 6 PER CONCORDIAM: J.
EUR. SEC. & DEF. ISSUES 19 (2015).
54. See Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part II, supra note 3 (“While the U.N.
counter-terrorism architecture and, to some degree, States, know they have to gender their counterterrorism and P/CVE approaches, there is very little idea of what this actually means in practice. As a
result, gender is treated as synonymous with women . . . “). See also Emily Winterbotham & Elizabeth
Pearson, Different Cities, Shared Stories: A Five-Country Study Challenging Assumptions Around Muslim
Women and CVE Interventions, 161 RUSI J. 54 (2016).
55. See Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part II, supra note 3.
56. See KAPUR, supra note 11, at 16 (arguing that “rights discourse” has “translated into a general
tightening of the sexual security regime,” and has “enabl[ed] a broader justification for the
establishment of security regimes and the unleashing of military and ‘civilizing’ missions in developing
countries in the name of women’s rights.”). See also Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local
in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary
Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 341 (2006) (describing the “successes” of
“governance feminism” as embodying “very state-centered, top-down, sovereigntist feminist rule
preferences”).
57. See Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part II, supra note 3.
58. Winterbotham & Pearson, supra note 54, at 54.
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gender is mobilized, by whom, and to what end. Significantly, much of the push
to add a gender perspective to national security came from security actors rather
than gender experts.59 This meant the ways that gender was taken into account
were often both “amateur” (not much more than a version of “add women and
stir”) and utilitarian (designed to make security policy better rather than
inherently inclusive).60 Because security, not gender equality, was the main
rationale and because security, rather than gender, experts led the charge on this,
this also laid the way for harmful gender stereotypes to form the basis of decisionmaking. This includes stereotypes of women as “peaceful”61 and programs
focused on mothers62 that trade on highly-gendered and problematic images of
women’s vulnerability and maternal nature.
Additionally, this focus on “women” rather than gender has generated a new
set of harmful blind spots in national security decision-making. These failures
mean, for example, that there is an absence of analysis of the broader societal
conditions (including of patriarchy) in which women experience, undertake, and
combat all forms of violence. Policy-making spaces that analyze violence also often
sideline the development of preventative strategies that address the role of
masculinities in violence.63 And when it comes to both gender-based violations by
terrorist groups and from State national security policy, while it is difficult to get
States to address impacts on women, it is even more challenging to convince
governments to protect male and LGBTI victims from gender-related abuses. In
these ways, it is increasingly evident that this focus on “women” means—either
unintentionally or otherwise—sidelining genuine, broader feminist inquiry into
the status quo of unequal gendered power relations that profoundly shape how
individuals experience terrorism and its response. Additionally, because “gender”
in practice translates to a focus on not all women, but on Muslim women, gendered
security policies have had adverse intersectional effects. Indeed, modern national
security policies at various junctures approach Muslim women as mothers,64 as in
need of empowerment, and/or also potentially dangerous agents themselves. A
series of intersectional gendered harms flow from these terms of engagement.65

59.
60.
61.

Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part II, supra note 3.
Id.
See, e.g., BELQUIS AHMADI & SADAF LAKHANI, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, AFGHAN WOMEN AND
VIOLENT EXTREMISM: COLLUDING, PERPETRATING OR PREVENTING? 12 (2016), https://www.usip.org/
sites/default/files/SR396-Afghan-Women-and-Violent-Extremism.pdf (“Existing interventions are
often based on assumptions about the role of women as inherent peacebuilders.”).
62. EMILY WINTERBOTHAM, TONY BLAIR INST. FOR GLOB. CHANGE, DO MOTHERS KNOW BEST? HOW
ASSUMPTIONS HARM CVE (2018), https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/do-mothers-know-besthow-assumptions-harm-cve (“Many CVE schemes have centred on mothers having the innate and
physical ability, as main care-givers, to be better able to spot signs of radicalization.”).
63. See, e.g., ELIZABETH PEARSON, TONY BLAIR INST. FOR GLOB. CHANGE, WHY MEN FIGHT AND
WOMEN DON’T: MASCULINITY AND EXTREMIST VIOLENCE (2018), https://institute.global/insight/coexistence/why-men-fight-and-women-dont-masculinity-and-extremist-violence.
64. See generally Katherine Brown, Gender and Counter-Radicalization: Women and Emerging CounterTerror Measures, in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 36.
65. See generally SHAKIRA HUSSEIN, FROM VICTIMS TO SUSPECTS: MUSLIM WOMEN SINCE 9/11 (2019);
Sahar F. Aziz, From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim-American Women in the Crosshairs of
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While “most strategies to counter violent extremism are generic” on paper, “they
tend to target specific groups determined to be most ‘at risk’ of being drawn to
violent extremism” in practice.66
The second core reason why this gendering of national security is potentially
so harmful is that governments have also largely evacuated human rights from the
process and/or used human rights to provide cover for approaches that do not
actually advance gender equality. Examples of governments sidelining rights
while also gendering national security policies are abundant. One example is in
the policy-making that encourages women’s participation in counter-terrorism
and P/CVE. This has sidelined rights in that promoting women’s engagement has
rarely been premised on the human rights to non-discrimination and equality.
Instead, it focuses on the strategic rationale that it leads to a more comprehensive
understanding of the causes of violent extremism, as well as more localized and
credible strategies to build resilience.67 Another example of how rights are
sidelined is in those government approaches that promote women’s rights as not
just the right but the smart thing to do in national security policy. This downplays
rights by presenting women’s rights as conditional and a means to the end of
counter-terrorism and enhancement of State power rather than an end in and of
themselves.68 These types of framings work to detach the goals of women’s
inclusion and gender mainstreaming from substantive equality agendas in ways
that can make it difficult, without more, to see them as successful from a feminist
and human rights perspective.69
Another example of how rights are diminished in gendered approaches to
national security lies in the area of policy-making for female victims of terrorism.
While governments talk of the importance of ensuring victims’ rights, ongoing
impunity for terrorist actors is instead the norm. Frequently, rather than
guaranteeing the full range of victim’s rights (including sexual and reproductive
rights), States instead punitively regulate women’s sexual and reproductive health
by denying access to abortion for rape victims.70 A recent trend that further
highlights this de-prioritization of rights is that some States are now not just doing
a lazy version of gender without rights, but are instead treating gender and human
rights as options to choose between when it comes to making national security
policy.71 Under this approach, governments actually preference a gender lens over
a human rights one, seemingly on the understanding that integrating women in
national security policy will give them credibility but also will be less burdensome
and restrictive than ensuring that their security approaches comply with human
Intersectionality, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 191 (2012); Nadine Strossen, Freedom and Fear Post9/11: Are We Again Fearing Witches and Burning Women?, 31 NOVA L. REV. 279 (2007).
66. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/65, supra note 7, ¶ 43 (citation omitted).
67. Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 555–56. See Ní Aoláin & Huckerby,
Gendering Counterterrorism: Part II, supra note 3.
68. Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 556.
69. Id.
70. See Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part II, supra note 3.
71. Id. (“In other words, countries looking to show bona fides on counter-terror treat adding
women as the low-hanging fruit compared with ensuring human rights and present the two
approaches as alternate choices, such that agreeing to gender mainstream lets them off the hook when
it comes to rights.”).
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rights.72 A final measure of this ongoing elevation of gender over human rights
perspectives is that States are still not addressing the adverse gendered human
rights effects of security measures. Indeed, not all of the areas of policy focus
mentioned above—women as perpetrators and victims of terrorism, as well as
agents in counter-terrorism and P/CVE who might also experience adverse human
rights impacts from national security—get equal attention from policymakers.73
Particularly, governments and other actors have markedly de-prioritized the
policy strand that requires them to address the “impacts of counter-terrorism
strategies on women’s human rights and women’s organizations.”74 This
consistent evacuation of rights is particularly damaging because it is occurring at
the very moment that contemporary national security measures risk further
gendered harms, as discussed further below.
Crucially, many of these examples of sidelining rights simultaneously
involve the State trying to co-opt rights language to expand and enhance counterterrorism measures. For example, while ignoring the rights of female victims of
terrorism in practice, States use this focus on women’s vulnerability and the
narrative of “saving” women from terrorists as a pretext for further coercive
measures that center the State.75 This next section explores in more detail two areas
where governments have explicitly put gender and human rights together in
national security in ways that are ultimately antithetical to gender equality.
III. GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY
This phenomenon of national security policy adversely impacting gender
equality and other gender-related rights is true even for those areas that have
explicitly sought to put gender and human rights together. Of the different areas
of policy-making focused on women described above, two stand out for how
much they notionally seek to integrate a gender perspective that centers women’s
agency. The first is promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment as a
national security tactic, as well as emphasizing promotion of women’s
participation in security roles.76 The second is using a feminist perspective to
encourage greater attention to women’s engagement in proscribed groups.
Before looking at each of these policy strands, it is helpful to recall the
normative backdrop to them. Part of the reason that gender equality and national
security became linked in the first place was because of the concern that the
aftermath of 9/11 might cause gain reversals in the area of women’s rights.77 This

72. Id.
73. Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part I, supra note 2.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 548.
76. Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part II, supra note 3.
77. See, e.g., Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 543 (noting “one core
theme—either implicit or explicit—in many feminist accounts of the post-9/11 era is that of gain
reversal”). See also id. at 546–47. See generally Halley et al., supra note 56, at 40 (identifying the
“incremental but by now quite noticeable installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legalinstitutional power” in the early twenty-first century); HALLEY, supra note 44 (tracing the influence of
feminism globally and in the United States); Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the
Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2008–
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linking also borrowed the general rationale from the women, peace, and security
space that “peace is inextricably linked with equality between men and women.”78
The corollary of asserting this was to then argue that “an increase in women
empowerment and gender equality has a positive effect on countering extremism,
as it does similarly in peace building.”79 In practice, the emphasis on feminism-ascounter-terrorism is encapsulated by the oft-repeated policy assertion that: “While
women do sometimes play an active role in violent extremist organizations, it is
also no coincidence that societies for which gender equality indicators are higher
are less vulnerable to violent extremism.”80 Then-U.S. Under Secretary for Civilian
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Sarah Sewall put an even finer point on
it in 2016 when she stated that “in reality, CVE is a feminist agenda” and called on
women to “seize this opportunity” to “reframe their rights and roles as part of the
most salient international security effort of the 21st century.”81 More recently,
women’s empowerment has also been seen as an enabling condition for women’s
more successful engagement in these security spaces.82 This has led to programs
such as “community theatre shows, which promote messages of women’s
empowerment and community harmony;”83 “empowerment,” through promotion

2009) (outlining the impact of organized feminism on international criminal tribunals during the
1990s).
78. See Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka & Radhika Coomaraswamy, Women are the Best Weapon in the
War Against Terrorism, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 10, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/10/women-arethe-best-weapon-in-the-war-against-terrorism/.
79. KRISTA LONDON COUTURE, , CTR. FOR 21ST CENTURY SEC. & INTELLIGENCE AT BROOKINGS, A
GENDERED APPROACH TO COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: LESSONS LEARNED FROM WOMEN IN
PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION APPLIED SUCCESSFULLY IN BANGLADESH AND MOROCCO viii
(2014) (emphasis omitted), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/30-gend
er-conflict-prevention-countering-violent-extremism-couture/women-cve-formatted-72914-couture-fi
nal2.pdf. See also COOMASWARMY, supra note 47, at 227 (arguing that there is a link but that “[i]ncreasing
recognition of women’s participation and empowerment should not be part of counter-terrorism
strategies but a part of the civilian peace agenda.”).
80. U.N. Doc. A/70/674, supra note 12, ¶ 53.
81. Sarah Sewall, U.S. Dep’t of State, Under Sec’y for Civilian Sec., Democracy, & Human Rights,
Women & Countering Violent Extremism, Remarks at the Commission on the Status of Women in New
York City (Mar. 17, 2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/remarks/254868.htm.
82. See, e.g., JACQUI TRUE ET AL., UN WOMEN, EMPOWERING WOMEN FOR PEACEFUL COMMUNITIES:
EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA AND BANGLADESH 6 (2018), https://monash.figshare.com/articles/ Empow
ering_women_for_peaceful_communities_Evidence_from_Indonesia_and_Bangladesh/7125617
(“However, gender discrimination and inequalities in the family and community may inhibit the full
realization of women’s agency in P/CVE . . . Thus, to effectively engage with the gendered dynamics
of violent extremism and reverse its effect, prevention and response efforts must prioritize women’s
rights, empowerment, participation and leadership—both at the community level, as well as in national
decision-making.”).
83. Id.
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of “women’s leadership and economic empowerment;”84 and supporting women
as “mainstream” voices to develop counter-narratives to violence.85
While the litany of problems with these approaches in practice have been
well-documented, they nonetheless bear repeating here.86 That presenting
women’s rights as a means to an end opens the way for bartering of rights when
it is perceived that this will help appease terrorist groups.87 That such approaches
instrumentalize or use women88 and that when programs targeting women are
subsequently dropped this creates a huge fallout for these groups.89 That
securitization of women’s organizations generates backlash when groups are
considered too tied to security agendas and removes a non-securitized space for
women’s rights advocacy.90 That women’s rights can be invoked to service
repressive international policy responses in counter-terrorism and practice,91
including through the focus on Muslim women’s empowerment in particular,92 as
well as in other “soft” approaches.93 And that security policies in the name of
women’s rights—such as restrictions on Muslim’s women’s dress justified as being
for both security and gender equality goals94—can actually create more insecurity
84. See, e.g., id. (noting that UN Women has a “four-track approach” to PVE in Asia and the Pacific
that involves “empowerment,” through promotion of “women’s leadership and economic
empowerment;” increased “participation and leadership” in counter-terrorism and PVE; research on
“drivers of extremist violence by sex and its impact on women and girls; and exerting “policy
influence” to “[e]nsure national and regional counter-terrorism frameworks integrate gender and are
informed by experiences of women”).
85. JAYNE HUCKERBY, CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOB. JUSTICE, WOMEN AND PREVENTING
VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE U.S. AND U.K. EXPERIENCES 4 (2012) [hereinafter HUCKERBY, PREVENTING
VIOLENT EXTREMISM].
86. See generally Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2; Huckerby, The
Complexities of WPS and CVE, supra note 41; Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part II,
supra note 3.
87. See, e.g., Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 581; U.N. Doc. A/64/211,
supra note 8, ¶ 36; HUCKERBY & FAKIH, supra note 1, at 28, 207–08.
88. See, e.g., Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 80–82; Ní Aoláin &
Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part II, supra note 3.
89. HUCKERBY, PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, supra note 85, at 7.
90. See, e.g., Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 579–81.
91. See generally Kapur, supra note 17, at 214 (“[T]he ‘War on Terrorism’ and its secondary goal of
protecting women has been addressed largely within the rhetoric of religion, civilization, and ‘a just
war,’ rather than a concern for women’s human rights. The focus on women’s concerns through the
prism of religion and culture not only serves to cast Muslim women as ‘Other,’ it also serves to justify
the liberating impulse of military intervention. . . .”).
92. Layla Saleh, (Muslim) Women in Need of Empowerment, 18 INT. FEMINIST J. POL. 1, 85 (2016)
(arguing that “[t]he biopolitical construction of the ‘(Muslim) woman in need of empowerment’ may
be considered an extension of the discourses emphasizing ‘saving’ women.”). See also id. at 82. (arguing
that “perpetuation of this sort of representation of the (Muslim) female subject creates open-ended
possibilities for US interventionist policies in the region for years to come . . .”).
93. See Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 555 (“[L]ater, broader, and ‘soft’
national security practices . . . also mobilized and reinforced such gendered images of vulnerability,
innocence and care. As such, this more recent account of contemporary counter-terrorism and CVE
shows how such images did not shut down the potential for non-military action, but instead dovetailed
with it in certain circumstances.”) (citations omitted).
94. See, e.g., Jayne Huckerby, France’s Burkini Bans Put Muslim Women in Danger, TIME (Aug. 24,
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for women by exposing them to hostile state scrutiny, as well as private backlash.95
This focus on Muslim women’s “empowerment” in national security discourses
can also perpetuate “‘Islamophobic stereotypes’” that center on Muslim women’s
inequality.96
Despite the thorough documentation of these challenges, the risks of such
approaches persist. More recently, some of these risks are present in efforts that
seek to demonstrate the links between misogyny and violent extremism.97 This
research, for example, suggests that “misogyny and violent extremism are
connected at an individual level.”98 Without commenting on the nature of these
conclusions, it is not difficult to anticipate how governments might implement
these findings in ways that are antithetical to human rights. For example, one
recommendation of this work is that “[e]vidence on individuals perpetrating
violence against women or domestic violence needs to inform efforts to counter
and prevent violent extremism.”99 Foreseeably, this focus could further discourage
reporting by victims because of potential coercive security consequences for
domestic abusers (similar effects have been observed in the immigration
enforcement context). Securitizing of services for victims of violence can also make
them more reluctant to access those services.100 Focusing on male violence against
women may reinforce harmful stereotypes of Muslim men as “violent” and antiwomen, as well as further sideline a focus on other forms of intimate partner
violence (for example, in same sex partnerships, or violence against men). Indeed,
similar problems have come with securitizing other areas of gender-based harm
against women, including for example, anti-trafficking responses.101 Additionally,
the finding that “women may support violence perpetrated against themselves or
other women . . . and that these women are likely to support violent extremism”102
risks doubling down on police failure to believe—and in some instances,
criminalize—victims because it can encourage seeing women as potential suspects
rather than victims themselves. As with the focus on gender-equality-as-securitytactic, such anti-gender-violence-as-security approaches can be superficially
appealing because they seek to address a core human rights challenge of violence
against women. But ultimately what lies behind these anti-gender-violence-assecurity policies is a shortchanged version of gender analysis that decouples
counter-terrorism policy from broader feminist analyses of the unequal gendered
power relations that accounts for both current gender-based patterns of violence

2016), https://time.com/4463743/frances-burkini-bans/.
95. Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part II, supra note 3.
96. Winterbotham & Pearson, supra note 54, at 59.
97. See generally Melissa Johnston & Jacqui True, Misogyny & Violent Extremism: Implications for
Preventing Violent Extremism, U.N. WOMEN (2019), https://arts.monash.edu/__data/assets/pdf_file/
0007/2003389/Policy-Brief_VE_and_VAW_V7t.pdf.
98. Id. at 6.
99. Id.
100. HUCKERBY, PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, supra note 85, at 12.
101. See, e.g., Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 569–70; see, e.g., Jayne
Huckerby, Unpacking the Trafficking-Terror Nexus, in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTERTERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 106.
102. Johnston & True, supra note 97, at 6.

Prof. Huckerby- FINAL PROOF 0306 (Do Not Delete)

194 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

3/6/2020 9:13 AM

Volume 27:179 2020

as well as how State-led responses actually already cause further insecurity for
victims.
The second area where gender and human rights are ostensibly conjoined, to
the detriment of rights, is in policies that tackle women’s involvement in terrorism
and violent extremism. Here the complex interplay between gender and rights
occurs because a gender equality lens has been used to encourage greater analysis
of female engagement in violence, but in ways that do not necessarily ensure
human rights protections for suspects. Indeed, a predominant push for this focus
has come from actors inspired by, and using, what are notionally gender equality
arguments, such as stressing that women can be as violent as men. For example,
advocates have decried governments’ failure to interrogate the role of masculinity
in violence, failure to recognize women’s historical engagement in violence, and
use of flattening and stereotyped assumptions of women as “innocent” or
“victims” who are tricked or married into proscribed groups in ways that overlook
their agency.103
Undoubtedly, all of these observations are true. Yet, this focus on women’s
agency in violence has not always been informed by a complete understanding of
gender or foregrounded in human rights. It has therefore, in many instances,
produced a set of gendered harms, including overly punitive, State-centered
responses to female violence. For example, in the case of women who traveled to
ISIS, pushback against governments’ arguments that all women are “jihadi brides”
has, in some instances, been a totalizing and sweeping insistence that all women
can be as violent as men. There has also been an unwillingness to examine how
conditions—including underlying and structural conditions related to economic
and social status, as well as grievances against the State—that lead to recruitment
are themselves gendered.104 This failure to identify where exactly female recruits
sit beyond the simple binary of innocent victims and willing terrorists has
undermined human rights. It means for example, that governments’ decisionmaking has overlooked mitigating circumstances, including whether the recruits
of ISIS themselves were victims of human trafficking.105 Governments have also
developed disproportionately punitive responses to female violence in some cases.
Germany’s prosecutions of women who have returned from ISIS for the war crime
of pillage when men are “predominantly” only charged with the membership in

103. See generally COOK & VALE, supra note 41; COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE EXECUTIVE
DIRECTORATE, GENDER DIMENSIONS OF THE RESPONSE TO RETURNING FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS:
RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES (2019) [hereinafter CTED, GENDER DIMENSIONS]; Elizabeth Pearson & Emily
Winterbotham, Women, Gender and Daesh Radicalisation, A Milieu Approach, 162 RUSI J. 60 (2017); Jayne
Huckerby, Opinion, When Women Become Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/ 2015/ 01/22/opinion/when-women-become-terrorists.html.
104. Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part II, supra note 3 (“Just one example of
the costs of gender without human rights is when strategies focus on women’s engagement in violence
but do so without addressing the role of human rights violations and grievances as conditions
conducive or motivations. For example, in overlooking the accounts of European women in ISIS about
how alienation and restrictions on their religious practices, like the burqa ban, helped push them into
the group, a key opportunity is missed for those concerned with security, as well as rights.”).
105. See Jayne Huckerby, When Human Trafficking and Terrorism Connect, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 22,
2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/62658/human-trafficking-terrorism-connect-dangers-dilemmas/.
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and/or support of a terrorist organization is one example.106 Another human rights
fallout from this hyper-agency approach that sees all women as dangerous is the
refusal of some governments to repatriate women from Iraq or Syria, as well as
children whose mothers are also there.107 While it is indeed true that women can
be terrorists too, this race to the bottom to ensure equally coercive punishment for
everyone is fundamentally antithetical to human rights and reinforces States’
coercive powers in the counter-terrorism realm.
IV. GENDERED NATIONAL SECURITY HARMS IN THE PRESENT MOMENT: SOME
CONSIDERATIONS

A. Locations of gendered national security harms
Recently, impacts of national security on gender and human rights have
become more widespread. Gendered security harms can now be traced in areas
ranging from development (for example, livelihood programs for men and boys
at the expense of women and girls)108 to family law (for example, custody orders
removing children from mothers because of “radicalization”).109 In large part, this
owes to the mission creep of national security itself, as well as failure to give
prominence to both gender and human rights as described above. In terms of the
mission creep of national security, the terms “terrorism,” “violent extremism,” and
“extremism” are meant to be on a sliding scale, with terrorism being the narrowest
range of behavior, and extremism being the widest.110 But the terms are either not
defined or defined over-broadly111 and are used interchangeably112 to criminalize
a wide swath of legitimate behavior that should not be seen as dangerous. The
human rights fallout from this has been gendered. For example, counter-terrorism
rules have been used against women’s rights defenders.113 And some governments
have sought to label feminism itself as a form of “extremism.”114
106. See, e.g., Alexandra Lily Kather & Anne Schroeter, Co-Opting Universal Jurisdiction? A Gendered
Critique of the Prosecutorial Strategy of the German Federal Public Prosecutor in Response to the Return of
Female ISIL Members: Part I & Part II, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 7, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/03/07/coopting-universal-jurisdiction-a-gendered-critique-of-the-prosecutorial-strategy-of-the-german-federal
-public-prosecutor-in-response-to-the-return-of-female-isil-members-part-i/. But see CTED, GENDER
DIMENSIONS, supra note 103, at 2 (“Research suggests that women tend to receive more lenient
treatment in the criminal-justice system, based on (often false) gendered assumptions about their
limited agency.”).
107. See, e.g., Elian Peltier, U.K. Takes Back Children from Former ISIS Territory, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/world/europe/britain-isis-children-syria.html.
108. See, e.g., HUCKERBY & FAKIH, supra note 1, at 38.
109. See, e.g., Fatima Ahdash, The Interaction Between Family Law and Counter-terrorism: A Critical
Examination of the Radicalisation Cases in the Family Courts, 30 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 389 (2018).
110. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/70/674, supra note 12, ¶ 4 (violent extremism is conceptually understood
to address an even “wider category of manifestations” than “terrorism.”).
111. Id.
112. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/65, supra note 7, ¶ 13.
113. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/52, supra note 36, ¶¶ 53, 58.
114. See, e.g., Megan Specia, Saudi Anti-Extremist Force Names Feminists as a Target. Briefly, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/13/world/middleeast/saudi-feminismextremism-video.html; Russia Treating Feminists as ‘Extremists’ Amid Crackdown on Dissent,
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In addition to these increased openings for coercive gendered national
security crackdowns, this widening of national security practice has another
important gendered effect. It creates a greater number of spaces in which rights
can potentially be compromised along gendered lines even when the policies
themselves are not explicitly coercive. For example, in these spaces, problematic
gender stereotypes, particularly those of Muslim women’s inequality, can feature
in ways that lead to gendered harms. One example is the buy-in to the concept of
radicalization as being a consequence of failed integration. This expanded the
reach of P/CVE and meant that security policies could get linked to and/or become
synonymous with integration agendas that seek to secularize Muslim women as a
“fix” for failed integration.115 Another example is when counter-narratives or
messaging programs became part of national security approaches.116 Here it was
governments’ conventional wisdom that the most persuasive messengers or
“credible” voices were the traditional actors in communities (for example, certain
religious leaders) or male “formers;” however, such efforts overlooked the efforts
of local women actors to minimize the sway of these voices, as well as the
consequences of giving them more of a platform.117
B. Interplays of State and non-State gendered security harms
Gendered harms in the national security space come from a series of complex
interplays between non-State violence and official responses, and from
incongruences among government policies themselves. On the former, I have
previously used the concept of “squeezing” to describe the experience of women
and women’s organizations being caught between proscribed actors on the one
hand, and security policies on the other.118 One example of this is when States fail
to recognize the asylum claims of women who have experienced gender-based
abuse by terrorist groups (for example, as slaves or cooks) because such activities
are deemed to be material support for terrorism.119 This punishment of female
victims at the very moment that States encourage support of victims of terrorism
demonstrates just how precarious women’s rights are in this space between the
INDEPENDENT (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-feministsextremists-putin-crackdown-a7900906.html.
115. Winterbotham & Pearson, supra note 54, at 56 (“In The Netherlands, well-established CVE
programmes have been linked to initiatives aimed at the integration of Muslim women through
secularisation processes and have been criticised for seeking to impose a particular understanding of
equality on women, which many Dutch Muslim women reject.” (citing Sarah Bracke, Subjects of Debate:
Secular and Sexual Exceptionalism, and Muslim Women in The Netherlands, 98 FEMINIST REV. 28 (2011))).
116. Logan Macnair & Richard Frank, Voices Against Extremism: A Case Study of a Community-based
CVE Counter-narrative Campaign, 10 J. FOR DERADCIALIZATION, 147, 150 (2017) (noting “the release of
counter-messages and counter-narratives” as part of CVE initiatives).
117. Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 554 (citing HUCKERBY & FAKIH, supra
note 1, at 27, 107–10).
118. See HUCKERBY & FAKIH, supra note 1, at 23; Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra
note 2, at 557. See also U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 8, ¶ 23 (“Those subject to gender-based abuses are
often caught between targeting by terrorist groups and the State’s counter-terrorism measures that may
fail to prevent, investigate, prosecute or punish these acts and may also perpetrate new human rights
violations with impunity.”).
119. U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 8, ¶ 50; see, e.g., HUCKERBY & FAKIH, supra note 1, at 100.
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State and terrorist groups. State and non-State actions also intersect in those
instances where State security coercion creates additional opportunities for
gendered non-State violence. One example is when coercive national security
measures that stigmatize Muslim communities generate Islamophobia that then
results in private targeting of Muslim women who wear visible signs of religious
dress.120
However, to fully encapsulate gendered national security harms requires
explicitly broadening the concept of squeezing from government qua terrorists to
also address squeezing from government qua government. The core way that this
State-State squeezing occurs is that national security policies themselves can often
be at cross-purposes when it comes to gender and human rights. Sometimes this
squeezing happens concurrently. One example of this is the “policy
incoherence”121 that results from the interaction of counter-terrorism financing
laws and P/CVE programs that target women. This occurs because “[o]n the one
hand, P/CVE increasingly emphasizes the need for grassroots and localized efforts,
including the participation of women. On the other, because of rules to combat
terrorism financing, those are the very groups that are most difficult to fund.”122
In other instances, the squeezing of women and women’s organizations is between
different eras or iterations of government national security measures. National
security programs targeted at women do not occur in a vacuum, yet there can be
a tendency among policymakers to move through different approaches without
always thinking of the footprint of previous measures.123 For example, as
mentioned above, before women-targeted P/CVE programs were adopted, P/CVE
measures that explicitly targeted credible voices, sometimes emboldened actors
(including former extremists or religious leaders) in communities in ways that
could be inimical to women’s rights.124 Research also shows the ways in which
counter-terrorism and P/CVE has stigmatized Muslim communities and that this
has led to some wariness about subsequent programs that then seek to engage
women.125
C. Challenges in measuring gendered national security harms
At the very same time as the gendered human rights impacts of national
security have become more widespread—including from the very policies that
seek to be gendered—and implicate a series of State-State and State/non-State

120. Sabrina Alimahomed-Wilson, Invisible Violence: Gender, Islamophobia, and the Hidden Assault on
U.S. Muslim Women, 5 WOMEN, GENDER, & FAMILIES OF COLOR 73 ( 2017); Huckerby, Gender, Violent
Extremism, and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 41.
121. TIGHTENING THE PURSE STRINGS, supra note 30, at 16.
122. Id. (citations omitted).
123. See, e.g., HUCKERBY & FAKIH, supra note 1, at 14.
124. See, e.g., id. at 27, 107–10. See also Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 147, 214 (2014) (noting that community policing “interlocutors, most of whom are men,
can further entrench their gatekeeper status,” such that “large segments of Muslim communities,
particularly youth and women, could suffer an intra-community subordinating effect of being voiceless
and bereft of individual agency”).
125. Winterbotham & Pearson, supra note 54, at 58 (identifying CVE fatigue as an “obstacle to
working with Muslim women”).
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interactions, these impacts have become even harder to identify and track. When
it came to documenting the immediate post-9/11 measures and their impacts on
gender and human rights, this was a difficult undertaking. Governments had (and
still have) a heavy lack of transparency on the human rights outcomes of their
security approaches—from invoking arguments about state secrecy to shield
actions from scrutiny; to the failure of international and regional institutions to
fully press governments on their human rights record; to penalizing human rights
defenders that seek to document the fallout of actions taken in the name of
counter-terror. Additionally, as mentioned above, governments also had a block
on seeing that they might—intentionally or unintentionally—harm women’s
rights through the “War on Terror” at the very same time they purported to “save”
women from misogynist terrorists. Also relevant is that in the aftermath of the
events of 9/11, many human rights advocates’ eyes were trained on violations
happening in places like Guantánamo Bay and CIA “black sites.” This was
necessary, but as feminists have long-noted, such a focus on government civil and
political rights violations against men in places of detention can exclude an
accounting of a broader set of gendered harms,126 such as impacts of non-State
violence (for example, terrorism) on women, as well how official security policies
that target male family members impact the economic, social, and cultural rights
of females. Nonetheless, there were still some familiar tools that were available for
initiating attention to gendered impacts of these predominantly “hard,” post-hoc
measures; primarily the work that had been done to document the impact of
“disappearances” on female family members, or the impacts of conflict and postconflict on women and girls.
Yet tracking the gender and human rights impacts of widening national
security practices (such as those that stem from P/CVE measures) is a slightly
different—as well as larger—undertaking. Some of these challenges are related to
programmatic features of P/CVE measures. P/CVE and even counter-extremism
programs often involve areas where there are usually otherwise very good and
important reasons for confidentiality (for example, in custody cases, decisions by
social workers, and in schools). Additionally, transparency is hampered by one of
the hallmarks of P/CVE which is the devolution of programs from national to more
local or community-based levels. This has necessarily meant a greater role for an
increasing array of governmental actors who have not historically been involved
in national security issues and who may have difficulty assessing threats based on
wide or opaque definitions of “terrorism,” “violent extremism,” and “extremism.”
At the same time, such localized decision-making may receive less public scrutiny
through the usual accountability tools, including litigation. Additionally, program
implementors may explicitly seek to hide the security funding of their programs
from beneficiaries,127 which has significant implications for their human rights.
126. See, e.g., Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 561. For the argument that
focusing on male victims of counter-terrorism deprioritized women’s experience as victims of
terrorism, see generally Karima Bennoune, Terror/Torture, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 40 (2008); Meredith
Tax, Women Have Rights Too, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
cifamerica/2010/dec/13/international-criminal-court-moreno-ocampo.
127. See, e.g., Nosheen Iqbal, “We Acknowledge We Went Wrong”: Lifestyle Website for Muslim Teens
Admits it Should Have Been Clearer About Home Office Funding, GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.
theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/sep/15/lifestyle-website-for-muslim-teens-is-covertly-funded-by-the-
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An additional factor compounding the transparency gap when it comes to
gendered harms lies in the accepted wisdom that it is “notoriously difficult” to
evaluate P/CVE programs, whether they be generic or targeted at women.128
Further hindering a thorough gender and human rights perspective is also the fact
that the evaluation that does take place tends to focus on efficacy rather than
rights’ impacts.129 Additionally, in some cases, because of the ill-defined nature of
“terrorism,” “violent extremism,” and “extremism,” as well as their responses, it
is genuinely unclear what is being measured. This is particularly the case when it
comes to evaluating P/CVE programs, that in some cases, can be for all intents and
purposes essentially repackages of existing programs (for example, on conflict
prevention or gender equality) albeit through a security lens.130 In these cases,
assessing impact can look like a mish-mash of assessing gender equality goals,
alongside P/CVE ones, and sometimes, without a clear theory of change as to how
the two might even be linked.131 Finally, what is rare, indeed almost fully absent,
are evaluative efforts that ask, as a starting point, whether communities and/or
beneficiaries even want national security programs that target women and/or
gender equality.132 This raises concerns under a gender and human rights-based
approach, which requires the centering of the perspectives of those most affected
by the adoption of governmental security measures.133
D. Toward a typology of gendered security harms
It is beyond the scope of the Article to develop a full typology for analyzing
gendered national security harms.134 However, the challenges of measuring harms,
home-office.
128. Winterbotham & Pearson, supra note 54, at 54.
129. See generally U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME & INTERNATIONAL ALERT, IMPROVING THE
IMPACT OF PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM PROGRAMMING, A TOOLKIT FOR DESIGN, MONITORING AND
EVALUATION (2018). See also U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/46, supra note 36, at 1 (identifying “the lack of a robust
scientific basis for the current policies and practices aimed at preventing and countering violent
extremism and the complete absence of human rights-based monitoring and evaluation, including by
United Nations entities,” and that “[t]here has been a distinct upsurge in policy and programming
addressing the gender dimension of violent extremism, yet there has been no systematic monitoring
and evaluation assessing the merits, impacts or human rights compliance of such programming.” Id.,
¶ 40).
130. Ní Aoláin & Huckerby, Gendering Counterterrorism: Part II , supra note 3 (noting that “women’s
groups [are] increasingly feeling pressure to reorient their activities to fit a national security objective
in order to attract much-needed funding even if this is a mismatch for their programs and
beneficiaries”).
131. See, e.g., MOHAMED ABDILATIF, UN WOMEN, ENGAGING WOMEN IN PREVENTING AND
COUNTERING EXTREMIST VIOLENCE IN KENYA (2017) (draft report), https://gate.unwomen.org/Evaluati
onDocument/Download?evaluationDocumentID=9084.
132. One exception is Winterbotham & Pearson, supra note 54, at n.50 (identifying the research
question as: “How wanted and needed are CVE programmes targeting women in the communities
they are intended to help?”).
133. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25(a), Dec. 19, 1966, 99
U.N.T.S 171; Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 7, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
134. See Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 567–69 (I have previously
developed a tripartite typology for understanding “State-based harms toward women and girls in the
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as well as the increasing number of locations of rights violations, mean that some
preliminary thoughts should be offered. This Article has presented a variety of
different types of gendered security harms that come from different sets of
policies. One set can be thought of as policies that are gendered and overtly
coercive in that they are intended to crackdown on human rights of persons of
different genders. This includes, for example, coercive security practices against
men (including disappearances) that also create a host of rights violations against
female family members (including for example, coercive interrogations and
limited access to services).135 Punitive policies against women for engagement in
violence because of perceived violations of gender stereotypes are another
example.136 Targeted attacks against women’s rights defenders or feminism itself
in the name of national security is another.137 Another set of measures is similar in
that such policies seek to be gendered, but rather than being part of the “hard”
security toolkit, they are meant to be non-coercive or “soft.” These policies too can
nonetheless have adverse human rights effects, including because they embody
harmful or problematic stereotypes of women, particularly Muslim women. This
includes programs that target Muslim mothers as antidotes to violence in their
families.138 It can be useful here to think also of development programs that target
men and boys because they are perceived to be “at risk” of violence, which then
result in less programming for women and girls.139
Unlike the two previous types of measures, which might be gendered and
pay little attention to human rights, there is a third type of measure that does
reference rights but, paradoxically, has adverse impacts. Policies in this group are
ones that actually seek to promote women’s rights, gender equality, and women’s
participation as means to the end of ensuring national security. Examples here are
policies that seek to “empower” women as security actors but do so without
considering gendered conditions in domestic contexts where the policies are being
implemented. Such local conditions might make it dangerous and/or counterproductive for women actors to either document or label their work as counterterrorism or P/CVE because their work runs counter to patriarchal norms and it
puts them in too-close proximity to security services.140 And finally, a series of
gendered harms come from those policies which are gender-neutral and where the
disregard of human rights may be intentional or non-intentional. Here, gendered
harms can come from gender blindness, including the failure to consider the
operating conditions in which measures are implemented. This would also
name of national security” that embodies an intersectional approach and recognizes that “such policies
have undermined the rights of women and girls through their focus on men and boys as the subject of
counter-terrorism interventions;” “directly discriminated against women and women’s rights
organizations;” and “involved discriminatory treatment because of a failure to consider the underlying
gender dynamics in the operating environments in which measures are being implemented.”).
135. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 8, ¶ 30; Ramzi Kassem, Gendered Erasure in the Global
“War on Terror”: An Unmasked Interrogation, in GENDER, NAT’L SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM:
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 13, at 15.
136. See supra notes 105–107.
137. See supra notes 113–114.
138. See supra notes 32, 53, 62.
139. See, e.g., HUCKERBY & FAKIH, supra note 1, at 38.
140. Huckerby, Feminism and International Law, supra note 2, at 581.
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include, for example, counter-terrorism financing measures that are genderneutral but in practice discriminatory.141
CONCLUSION
For those concerned with the where, how, and why of when gendered
approaches to human rights do—or do not—get mobilized in governance, the field
of national security provides a remarkable case study. The account of the role of
gender and human rights from the post-9/11 to the present is a complicated, and
shifting, one. This Article provides an overview of the interplay between gender,
human rights, and national security in three main ways—from no explicit
discussion of gender or human rights post-9/11; to a consideration of gender but
not from a genuine human rights perspective; to potential openings for a more
nuanced analysis of gender and human rights that have somewhat paradoxically
generated a new set of gendered human rights violations. While the turn to
consider gender as a central part of national security practice was long overdue,
this Article makes clear that there are costs when certain concepts of gender move
from the margins to more mainstream—or even predominant—areas of decisionmaking. Some of these costs occur because many of the efforts to gender national
security have lacked a full understanding of gender. Indeed, the powerful
potential of using gender as a lens has often been lost because policies focus solely
on women, rather than undertake a fundamental examination of unequal power
relations that shape both violence and its response. Notably, it is in this
circumscribed form that gender can become so much more palatable to decisionmakers, to the point that for some actors integrating “gender” is seen as an option
that is preferable to, and easier than, complying with human rights.
Other costs occur because of the ways in which gender has—or has not—been
linked to human rights. In some instances, the uptake of gender has been siloed
from human rights. In others, the two have been conjoined in ways that are not
furthering of gender equality, but instead generative of new harms including
because they encourage State-centric responses that may be punitive. One key way
to trace how gender and human rights are mobilized in national security and to
what ends is to track gendered security harms. Yet, to date, such harms are far
from fully-explored. This failure is particularly marked given their nature and
prevalence. Such harms involve complex intersections of State and non-State
violence in security settings and include adverse effects not just on persons of
different genders, but also on gendered stereotypes and on gendered hierarchies.
With the growing scope of national security practice, the harms now occur in
places that were not originally anticipated in the immediate aftermath of the
events of 9/11 and the national security architecture developed at that time. A full
account of the locations, nature, and scale of these gendered security harms, as
well as robust frameworks to measure and remedy them, is essential to the
analysis of how gender and human rights have featured in national security to
date. However, given the increasing attention to gender in national security
practices, this analysis is also a critical forward-looking exercise toward
understanding what it means to take an integrated gender and human rights-

141.

See generally TIGHTENING THE PURSE STRINGS, supra note 30.
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based approach to national security in ways that further, rather than undermine,
gender equality.

